What Baloch sub Nationalists want?

What Baloch sub Nationalists want? 

The narrative of ethnic Baloch nationalism 

Jan Achakzai 

The intellectual and ideologue of Baloch ethnic nationalism was the late Habib Jalib. He was not only a nationalist politician dedicated to the Baloch cause, but also was the brain behind the ideology of Baloch nationalism. He was a leftist intellectual. 

Baloch nationalist leadership could be classified into two categories: one that believed in centre-left nationalism and the second type was not only adherent of centre-left nationalism but also the follower of Marxism and Leninism as ideology underpinning their struggle against Islamabad.

Habib Jalib was contemporary to other Baloch Marxist-cum-nationalist leaders like young student leader Dr Khoer Baloch, Late Raziq Bugti and Late Sher Mohammad Marri who were also staunch believers of the all encompassing leftist ideology of Marxism and Leninism. Like them, Habib Jalib had a direct exposure to the Soviet system and ideology as he spent years in Soviet Union. 

After the end of the cold war the geo-political changes left Baloch nationalist leadership without a foreign sponsor and a sanctuary (ie, Afghanistan, and USSR). 

However, with the collapse of the political Left in Pakistan following the dismemberment of the ex-Soviet Union, the Marxist-cum-Balcoh nationalists became ultra-ethnic nationalist leaders. 

The advent of democracy after the plane crash of Gen Zia al Haq, raised hopes among the Baloch nationalist leadership who believed that peaceful struggle might enable Balochs to get their rights from Islamabad. Led by Nationalist Leader Attaulah Mengal, his son Akhtar Mengal, and Habib Jalib (among other) Baloch nationalists participated in elections eventually paving the way for Sardar Akhtar Mengal becoming Chief Minister of Balochistan in 1997. 

However, the other strand of Baloch nationalist leadership led by Nawab Khair Baksh Marri doubted that what he believed "controlled" democracy was the solution for Baloch grievances. Taking over the power by Gen Perves Musharraf in 1999 and subsequent killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in 2004, vindicated the stance of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, according to his disciples. 

This is why a new militant nationalist leadership led by London based Balach Marri (the young son of Nawab Khair Baksh Marri) and Brahamdagh Bugti (the grandson of Late Nawab Akbar Bugti) emerged on the scene. Although Balach Marri was subsequently killed, his elder brother Mir Harbiyar Marri is now in the driving seat leading the militancy. 

But the insurgency this time around was not limited to sardars or nawabs; a large section of Baloch middle class also joined in showing the frustration of some Balochs segments with Islamabad's alleged unwillingness to resolve their grievances as per their narrative. The ethnic Pashtun nationalists who also have a significant following were also supportive of militant Balochs in their cause, though strongly opposing militants’ methodology: targeted killings of innocent Punjabis and Pashtun businessmen in Baloch dominated areas, besides, taking up arms against the state. 

Late Habib Jalib and other Baloch leaders who still believed in parliamentary and peaceful struggle were increasingly left isolated by the militant leadership. The militants always infuriated when Prime Ministers be that Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani or Nawaz Sharif met veteran Sardar Attaulah Mengal 

However, now significantly downgraded though, the militant groups became formidable post 2006 and had increasingly made the job of Baloch moderate leaders like Habib Jalib very difficult. The moderate Baloch leadership was left to choose between bad and the worse options: if they continued to participate in peaceful parliamentary struggle, it would invoke the wrath of militants, or should they join hardliners, they would have put themselves in harm's way by ending up on the wrong side of the state's redline. 

During this period, the PPP-led political coalition and Nawaz Sharif governments offered NFC award18th Amendment, Aghas Haqooq Balochistan package, among other measures, but these attempts were too little. 

However, Balochistan’s problems could not be solved by these packages, PR campaigns, and other cosmetic measures bolstering ethnic nationalists' narrative against the federal government. 

The underlying issue is that Baloch nationalists across the board (including militants) believe that the civilian government-led by Imran Khan has no control over Balochistan policy and that the policy is being run by the establishment just like Pakistan's policy on Afghanistan, India, the US etc. They are not prepared to trust the assurances and guarantees of the federal government. 

Their demands are more of strategic nature–according to their "grievance based narrative": For example,

The rest of Pakistan is not prepared to buy Balochistan’s gas on market rate and have been enjoying below market prices where there are hundreds of villages in the province even today who are without gas connections.

There are fears that over the next two decades, Sui Gas reserves will be completely depleted. Ironically, people of villages located on the Iran and Afghanistan border are being assured that they wait for the gas and electricity supply from Iran and Central Asia, respectively.

The other grievance is related to Gawadar. The Baloch nationalists fear that since they have a tiny population in Pakistan, people from other provinces would flock to Gawadar and Balochs will become red Indians on their own land: only Gawadar’s population would surpass the total population of Balochs in Balochistan. For them Karachi is a case in point where, as per their interpretation, Urdu-speaking and Pashto speaking dwellers confined Sindhis to their villages in rural Sindh. 

That the exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources is underway. The rest of Pakistan has been exploiting Balochistan’s natural assets on the cheap while the province is a scene of neglect and deprivation even today. 

The establishment's narrative has been that it is the job of politicians, ie, the Federal and provincial governments to resolve political issues as they are only incharge of kinetic strategy; It is for the politicians to devise a strategy, and accept their fears and offer guarantees, while the militant Balochs are not ready to trust any assurances from the Federal and provincial government in this regard. 

Whatever their narrative is, their capability has been crippled and militancy is on its last throes. 

It is despite the fact that the Indian Hybrid strategy has weaponised the Baloch ethnic insurgency: The militants in receipt of India’s material/technical support and enjoying sanctuary in Afghanistan had shown more horned skills in explosives which reflected in their use and impact. 

Nonetheless, their methodology can not justify their grievances regardless of any merit; and all legitimacy vanishes into the thin air when a state's strategic adversary i.e., India, becomes a sponsor.